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This paper examines how the menu of investment options made available to workers in defined contribution
plans influences portfolio choice.  Using unique panel data of 401(k) plans in the U.S., we present
three principle findings.  First, we show that the share of investment options in a particular asset class
(i.e., company stock, equities, fixed income, and balanced funds) has a significant effect on aggregate
participant portfolio allocations across these asset classes.  Second, we document that the vast majority
of the new funds added to 401(k) plans are high-cost actively managed equity funds, as opposed to
lower-cost equity index funds.  Third, because the average share of assets invested in low-cost equity
index funds declines with an increase in the number of options, average portfolio expenses increase
and average portfolio performance is thus depressed.  All of these findings are obtained from a panel
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Over two dozen countries around the world now include individual investment accounts 
as part of their public pension systems.  Other countries, notably including the U.S., are also 
considering reforms that would allow individuals to directly invest part of their Social Security 
contributions in individual accounts.  A key issue in designing such a program is determining 
what investment choices to offer individual participants.  The simplest portfolio theory suggests 
that it is sufficient to provide a choice consisting of one portfolio of risky assets – the market 
portfolio – and one risk-free asset, and then to allow individuals to mix these two portfolios in 
accordance with their individual risk preferences.  Most public and private plans in the U.S. and 
abroad, however, provide a large number and broad range of choices.  For example, in the U.S., 
the vast majority of private sector defined contribution pension plans offer multiple investment 
options, often allowing individuals to choose from among several equity, bond, market and 
balanced fund options.  Individuals also have thousands of mutual funds to choose from when 
allocating their non-pension portfolios.  In Sweden, the Social Security system provides 
participants a menu of investment options that includes over 650 funds from which to choose.   
  The central question of this paper is whether the mix of investment options available to 
participants in an individual accounts program matters for portfolio allocation.  In particular, we 
are interested in the “behavioral” response to the selection of fund options, over and above any 
“mechanical” link by which we mean changes that flow directly from adding or relaxing a 
binding constraint.  For example, suppose an individual is prohibited from owning a particular 
asset class.  It is clearly the case that this constraint will alter their portfolio choice if, in the 
absence of the constraint, the individual would have invested in this asset class.  Instead, our 
focus is on the “behavioral” response, which might occur when a change in the menu of 
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investment options leads to a large change in asset allocation, even though the investment 
opportunity set has not significantly changed.  For example, imagine that an investor, faced with 
a choice between a diversified stock fund and a diversified bond fund, chose to allocate 50 
percent of her portfolio to each fund.  If this individual were provided a second diversified stock 
fund as a third investment alternative, then the overall investment opportunity set of this 
individual has not substantially changed because the additional stock fund is largely redundant of 
the first.  In this case, standard portfolio theory suggests that this individual’s optimal allocation 
would still be close to 50 percent bonds and 50 percent stocks.       
A growing body of evidence suggests, however, that many individual portfolio decisions 
may be influenced by plan design.  For example, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) suggest that many 
people follow a “naïve” diversification strategy, such as evenly dividing contributions across all 
available assets (e.g., a “1/n” strategy).  If this is the case, then simply changing the relative 
number of stock and bond funds may alter the allocation of an investor’s portfolio between 
stocks and bonds.  If people behave in this way, then firm managers or policymakers who are 
charged with determining the set of investment options to make available to participants in a 
corporate or government individual accounts program should consider how the choice of fund 
options will influence individual portfolio allocations. 
The private pension system in the U.S. – in particular, 401(k) plans, which are now the 
single most common private pension in the U.S. – provides a useful research laboratory with 
which to learn about these issues.  Because plan sponsors have significant leeway in choosing 
which investment options to make available, there is considerable time series and cross sectional 
variation in the set of investment opportunities facing 401(k) participants.  Using a rich panel 
data set on fund options and fund contributions to 401(k) plans during the 1990s, we examine 
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several issues in this paper related to how the structure of investment options within a plan 
affects participant diversification.  Unlike past work in this area that focuses on cross-sectional 
analyses, we are able to exploit the panel nature of our data to control for differences in the 
investment preferences of workers across firms and over time to better identify the effect of a 
change in 401(k) plan characteristics on participant behavior. 
We focus primarily on how the set of investment alternatives effects portfolio 
diversification.  While some prior research has suggested that overall portfolio diversification is 
affected by the menu of options (Benartzi and Thaler (2001)), Huberman and Jiang (2006) 
highlight some of the difficulties in making inferences about individual behavior based on plan 
level data.  For example, even if there is evidence at the plan level that contributions are divided 
roughly evenly across plan options, this could be because individuals are each following a 1/n 
strategy because 1/n of the individuals are each concentrating their portfolio in one option, or 
other intermediate combinations.  Nonetheless, in considering the set of investment options to 
make available to individuals through a large national pension system, the effect of the plan 
choice set on aggregate portfolio allocations is of substantial interest. 
Our data allows us to do a more comprehensive examination of plan level portfolio 
responses both within and across multiple asset classes over many years.  We find evidence that 
the allocation of contributions is significantly affected by the number and mix of investment 
options available, even after accounting for plan-level fixed effects.  For example, our estimates 
suggest that by increasing the share of equity funds from 1/3 to 1/2 (such as by adding an 
additional equity fund option to a plan that already offers company stock, one equity fund, and 
one bond fund), overall participant allocations to equity funds increase by 7.5 percentage points.  
We find similar strong effects for allocations to bond funds and balanced funds.  Given that the 
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fraction of equity options in the plan tends to increase substantially and the fraction of bond 
options tends to decrease substantially as plans offer more options over time, this leads to 401(k) 
participants taking on greater risk in their retirement portfolios with their higher equity 
allocations. 
We also address how the composition of actively vs. passively managed fund options has 
affected allocation decisions within 401(k) plans.  From 1990 to 2003, the number of mutual 
funds available to investors in the U.S. rose from 3,100 to 8,100, with the dramatic growth in 
actively managed equity funds (which quadrupled over the period) accounting for nearly 70% of 
the total increase (Investment Company Institute, 2005).  Consistent with this, we find the vast 
majority of the new funds added to 401(k) plans are also high-cost actively managed equity 
funds as opposed to lower-cost equity index funds.  For example, actively-managed equity funds 
represent nearly 2/3 of the new funds added to 401(k) plans in our sample over the period 1998-
2002, while index funds represent only about 1 out of 12 of the new funds added.  This result has 
strong implications for the relation between the investment performance of these retirement plans 
and the composition and number of fund options provided.  For example, we estimate that a 
move from a plan with only index funds to a plan with only actively-managed funds is associated 
with a 35 basis point increase in the annual plan-wide expense ratio paid by participants (as 
participants are investing more in higher-cost funds which are much more likely to be added on 
the margin).  Given historically that actively-managed funds do not outperform index funds 
(even before expenses), these investment patterns (coupled with actively-managed funds being 
much more likely to be the marginal fund added to the plan) could result in a nontrivial reduction 
in resources available for retirement. 
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  While not the main focus of our paper, we also address the importance of firm-level 
heterogeneity and investment restrictions upon the investment behavior of 401(k) participants.  A 
concern with any of the past cross-sectional analyses that have documented a strong relation 
between plan parameters and participant decisions is that an omitted factor such as differences in 
either the firms or the workers across firms could explain both the design of the 401(k) plan as 
well as the workers’ investment decisions (e.g., differences in the risk aversion or investment 
philosophy of workers across firms).  Ruling out such an alternative explanation is essential for 
identifying what role the characteristics of the plan (as opposed to unobserved characteristics of 
the participants of the plan) play in influencing investment decisions and is thus essential for 
public policy purposes.   
We present evidence that both plan parameters and firm-level heterogeneity are important 
determinants of how 401(k) assets are allocated across asset classes.  For example, the number of 
equity and bond options in the 401(k) plan is an important predictor of contributions to equity 
and bond funds, respectively, even after accounting for firm-level fixed effects.  On the other 
hand, while both the relation between the number of options in the plan and allocations to 
company stock and the “endorsement” effect found by Benartzi (2001)
1 are very strong in the 
cross-section, they are substantially diminished once firm-specific effects are accounted for in 
the regression.  This suggests that investments in company stock in pension plans appear to be 
driven in no small part by firm-level heterogeneity in the desirability of company stock 
investments (which manifests itself both in employee contributions to company stock, how many 
non-company stock options are present in the 401(k) plan, and employer match policy).   
                                                 
1 Benartzi (2001) finds that workers in firms where the employer provides a match in company stock tend to invest 
substantially more of their own contributions in company stock and attributes this to the workers viewing a firm 
match in company stock as implicit investment advice. 
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  This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides background information on the range 
of investment options offered in selected pension systems around the world, as well as in some 
U.S. reform proposals.  We also review the relevant literature relating to the influence of 
investment options on portfolio allocation.  In Section 3, we describe our data on 401(k) plans 
and provide some initial summary statistics about the range of investment options available.  In 
Section 4, we provide evidence on how the number and mix of investment options influences the 
allocation of contributions in 401(k) plans.  Section 5 demonstrates how trends in the mutual 
fund industry over the past decade such as the explosion of high-cost, actively-managed equity 
funds have affected 401(k) plans and participants.  Section 6 concludes with a discussion of 
policy implications. 
 
2.  Background  
2.1 Brief Overview of Range of Investment Options in Public Pension Plans Around the World 
Over the past two decades, a large number of countries have incorporated individual 
accounts into their public pension systems.  These countries span the globe, and include highly 
developed economies of Western Europe, transition economies from the former Soviet Union, 
and developing countries.  A notable exception to this trend is the United States, whose public 
Social Security program is entirely a traditional pay-as-you-go, defined benefit system.  Even in 
the U.S., however, proposals to introduce personal accounts as part of, or in addition to, the 
Social Security system have been forwarded by numerous commissions, think tanks, academics, 
members of Congress, and even the President.   
The plans that have been implemented around the world, as well as those proposed in the 
U.S., vary along many dimensions, including account size, the source of funding, and the degree 
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of access to funds before and during retirement, just to name a few.  One particularly important 
difference is the degree of portfolio choice provided to individuals, particularly during the 
account accumulation phase.  In general, architects of alternative plans have made different 
choices when faced with the trade-offs between allowing individual choice, ensuring some 
minimum level of portfolio diversification, and keeping administrative costs low.  As a result, 
different plans provide very different degrees of choice. 
At one end of the spectrum are plans that provide very limited choice.  As discussed in a 
recent survey by the GAO, “initially, several countries offered individuals choice among a 
limited number of investment options and often restricted the portion of assets that could be 
invested in certain products, such as publicly traded equities, private equities and foreign 
securities” (GAO, 2005).  For example, in Australia as of the late 1990s, the employer was 
generally given the authority to select the fund for the workers, and thus most workers had 
minimal choice in how to invest their retirement savings (CBO 1999).  Some U.S. reform 
proposals, such as Rep. Shaw’s “Social Security Guarantee Plus Act of 2003,” severely restrict 
choice.  For example, Shaw’s plan would require individuals to hold all account assets in a single 
fund that can be changed at most once per year.
2  The default option would be a portfolio 
allocation of 60 percent stock index funds and 40 percent high-grade corporate bond index funds.  
The only two alternative options simply allow slight deviations in the allocations (65 percent 
stock / 35 percent bonds or 70 percent stock / 30 percent bonds).  Another plan that starts out 
with tight restrictions on choice is the Rep. DeMint’s “Social Security Savings Act of 2003,” in 
which account balances would initially be maintained in a default portfolio with 65 percent in a 
                                                 
2 Details on Rep. Shaw’s proposal are taken from the January 7, 2003 memorandum to Rep. Shaw from the Social 
Security Office of the Chief Actuary “OASDI Financial Effects of the Social Security Guarantee Plus Act of 2003 
(H.R. 75) – Information.”  
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specified broad index fund of equities of U.S. corporations and 35 percent in long-term bonds 
issued by the Federal government.
3   
At the other end of the spectrum are plans that provide an extraordinarily wide range of 
choice.  In Sweden, for example, participants are able to choose from a menu of approximately 
650 mutual funds (Palme, et al, 2004).  However, participants are restricted to selecting at most 
five funds from this extensive menu (GAO 2005).  In the U.S. context, the Personal Security 
Account option (commonly referred to as the Schieber/Weaver plan) from the 1994-96 Social 
Security Advisory Council would have allowed virtually unfettered access to a broad universe of 
private sector investments.   
In between these two extremes is a wide range of plans.  For example, Mexico now has age-
based investment options available.  Chile requires each pension administrator to offer four types 
of funds with varying degrees of risk, including a higher risk fund and a fixed income fund 
(GAO 2005).  For younger workers, a fifth option (higher risk) is also available.         
How does the degree of investment choice affect portfolio behavior?  In some cases, the 
answer is obvious.  For example, in the U.S. Shaw proposal mentioned above, individuals are 
clearly forced into one of three pre-specified combinations of equities and bonds.  In most other 
cases, however, there are enough choices available that individual decisions about general asset 
allocations are not restricted.  Even in these cases, however, the potential exists for the menu of 
investment options to influence participant decisions about how to invest their individual account 
balances.  For example, if, as the number of investment options rises, the fraction of investments 
                                                 
3  Once the individual account balance reaches a specified level, two additional investments are available – a broad 
index of small-cap equities and a broad index of mid-cap equities.  Details on Rep. DeMint’s proposal are taken 
from the September 26, 2003 memorandum to Rep. DeMint from the Social Security Office of the Chief Actuary 
“Estimated Financial Effects of H.R. 3177, the Social Security Savings Act of 2003 – Information.” 
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that are in actively-managed equity funds also rises, might this influence overall portfolio 
allocations? 
The objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence on how the menu of investment 
options offered in an individual accounts system is likely to influence participant portfolio 
choices.  We will do this by using data on private-sector 401(k) plans, which like individual 
account programs around the world, are defined contribution retirement plans that provide 
participants with a specified set of investment options.  We can use both the time-series and 
cross-sectional variation in the number and type of investment options available to employees to 
learn how portfolio allocation is influenced by plan parameters.  Exploiting such data can help 
address the concern that firm-level differences in worker investing preferences may explain any 
cross-sectional correlations found.  This is an area that has been receiving increased attention in 
the economics literature, which we now briefly review. 
2.2  Literature on Investment Options and Portfolio Choice 
Within a neoclassical economics framework, the number of investment options available to 
an investor should matter only insofar as it alters one’s ability to diversify.  For example, if 
participants in a defined contribution account were provided with bond investment options only, 
and no equity investment options, then their portfolio choices would be constrained in an 
obvious way.  In reality, however, most 401(k) plans do not restrict investments in such an overt 
way.  Rather, the typical 401(k) plan offers participants a range of funds that invest in equities 
and bonds and allow participants to cover a wide range of the risk/return spectrum.  As such, in a 
world where all participants behave according to standard finance theory, the constraints 
imposed by the firm’s choice of options are unlikely to have a first order effect on an 
individual’s portfolio allocation across different asset classes. 
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Nonetheless, more recent “behavioral” research has shown that the composition of 
investment options selected by an employer can have a significant influence on participant 
portfolio allocation.  For example, Benartzi (2001) and Brown, Liang and Weisbenner (2006) 
examine the effect of employer 401(k) match policy, and find that when employers restrict 
individuals to hold employer stock, employees tend to purchase more employer stock in their 
own accounts, rather than less, as would be predicted by standard portfolio models.  Also, 
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) find evidence consistent with employees following “naïve 
diversification strategies,” i.e., allocating e/n of their contributions to equities when there are n 
investment choices available, e of which are equity funds, while Karlsson, Massa, and Simonov 
(2006) suggest that investors choose assets as a function of the way they are represented in the 
menu available to them. 
Plan design can influence numerous other behaviors as well.  Huberman, Iyengar, and Jiang 
(2007) show that the availability of an employer match increases participation and contributions, 
especially among low-income employees.  Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) and Ameriks and 
Zeldes (2001) show that investors are slow to rebalance portfolios, which can lead to allocations 
of total holdings that look very different than allocations of contributions.  Madrian and Shea 
(2001), Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003), and Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2004a) 
document the importance of plan design and employee inertia as they show that many new plan 
participants invest in the plan’s default investment option and are slow to move out of that option 
for potentially higher-return assets.  Agnew and Szykman (2005) also provide evidence that 
individuals with below average financial knowledge become “overwhelmed” by making 
investment decisions.        
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3.  Data  
3.1 Data Source 
  The primary source of data for this project is 401(k) plan level financial data from the 
1990s.  This rich source of data is compiled by hand from 11-k filings with the SEC, which a 
company files when it provides an option to invest in company stock that is deemed an offering 
of securities.  From these filings, we collect information about the number and type of 
investment options offered.  We categorize each investment option into one of five categories – 
company stock, equity funds (by which we precisely mean domestic equity funds excluding 
employer stock), international equity funds, bond funds (which includes money market, 
guaranteed investment contacts, government bonds, and corporate bond funds), and balanced 
funds.  For each investment option, we collect total participant contributions, total employer 
contributions, and total assets.  For the few firms with multiple plans, we collect data for the 
largest plan. 
  Starting with all U.S. firms listed in Compustat any year from 1993 to 1999, we identify 
firms that filed an 11-k at least once during this period.
4  We were able to hand-collect data for 
891 companies for which we could accurately classify their investment option, yielding 2,790 
firm-year observations.  As reported in table 1, most of the data are in the period 1993 to 1998, 
with the largest number of firms, 566, in 1998.  On average, there are just over three 
observations per firm, with 45 percent of the firms with two observations or less and 55 percent 
of the firms with three or more observations.  In 1999, there was a change in ERISA reporting 
requirements that led to substantially fewer companies reporting contributions by asset category, 
leaving us with contribution data for far fewer plans in 1999 and 2000 than in 1998.  The 1999 
                                                 
4 11-k filings are available on the SEC’s Edgar website starting in 1994.  The 1994 filing reports plan activity during 
1993.  Some firms will report not only plan activity during the past year, but also plan activity over the past three 
years.  Thus, we have 128 observations in 1992 and 29 observations in 1991. 
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and later filings, while lacking good contribution data, still provide asset balances.  We will 
make use of this data (and describe it more fully) to augment our sample when we examine the 
active vs. passive mutual fund choice below.           
To characterize our initial sample, we focus on firms in the sample in 1998, one of the 
more recent years with the largest number of firms.  As shown in table 2a, about one-half of the 
sample was a member of the S&P 1500 during 1998.
5  Thus, the typical firm in our sample is 
smaller, measured by both market value and employees, than the typical S&P 1500 firm, but is 
larger than the average of all public companies as available from Compustat.  The sample 
represents a broad cross-section of industries.  As noted in the table, 15 percent of the sample is 
in the technology sector, somewhat less than the overall market. 
Companies that issue shares for their retirement plan, rather than purchase shares on the 
open market, are required to file an 11-k.  While this raises the possibility that the sample could 
be biased toward firms that do not repurchase stock, in separate work (Brown, Liang & 
Weisbenner 2006) we document that repurchase activity by firms in our sample does not differ 
from that at other publicly-traded firms.
6   
We also compare our sample of plans to those at publicly-traded firms as reported on 
Form 5500 filed with the DOL.
7  In the aggregate, for our sample of the largest plans at 566 
companies in 1998, total plan assets were $249 billion, representing 36 percent of the $698 
billion in plan assets at all publicly-traded companies (table 2b).  Total contributions by 
participant and company for our sample totaled $13.9 billion, 28 percent of the $49.2 billion for 
                                                 
5 The S&P 1500 consists of the 1500 stocks that comprise the S&P 500 index, the S&P 400 MidCap index, and the 
S&P 600 SmallCap index. 
6 In the uncommon event that the plan does not allow employees to purchase company stock but does provide the 
employer match in company stock, it would generally not be deemed an offer of securities, and the plan would not 
be required to file an 11-k.  In our discussion with SEC staff, the onus is on the company to determine whether it 
needs to file an 11-k. 
7 Publicly-traded companies in the DOL Form 5500 data set were identified by whether they had a CUSIP and 
matching EINs with those in Compustat. 
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publicly-traded firms.  Estimates from the DOL for 1998 for all US companies, public and 
private, are $1.54 trillion in assets and $135 billion in contributions.   
As highlighted earlier, a key advantage to this data over data used in prior studies on 
portfolio options and investment allocations is that we have a panel comprised of companies with 
multiple years of plan information.  As such, we are able to trace how changes in investment 
structure influence portfolio behavior over time, while controlling for cross-sectional differences 
in firms. 
3.2  Summary Statistics on Fund Options 
In Table 3, we report the composition of plan options and employee contributions in 401(k) 
plans by the type of fund (i.e., company stock, domestic equity, international equity, bond, and 
balanced) across our pooled data 1991-2000.  The average firm (across plans and years) provides 
7.8 investment options, and the median offering has 7 funds.  Over 80 percent of the firm-year 
observations offer between 4 and 12 options, inclusive. 
Table 3 also shows substantial heterogeneity in the type of funds offered and contributions 
to the various asset classes.  While domestic equity funds constitute only 29% or less of plan 
options at one quarter of the firm-year observations, they constitute at least half of the options at 
another quarter of the observations.  The interquartile range for the share of bond funds in the 
401(k) plan also spans 20 percentage points (the 25
th percentile is 20% of fund options while the 
75
th percentile is 40% of fund options).  International funds and balanced funds are a small share 
of offerings for the majority of firms.   
There are also striking differences across firms in the investment decisions made by 
participants in their 401(k) plans.  While only 31% or less of employee contributions are 
allocated to domestic equities at one quarter of the firm-year observations, they constitute at least 
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58% of the allocations made at another quarter of the observations.  There are also substantial 
differences in the investments in company stock and bond funds across firms. 
Of course, if employees are not unduly influenced by the mix of options, for example by 
following an optimal portfolio strategy or by allocating according to a fixed allocation rule (e.g., 
a 60/40 equity/bond mix), then increasing the proportion of equity fund options should not have 
a large effect on the individual’s overall equity exposure.  In contrast, if the mix of options does 
influence behavior, as would be the case if participants follow a naïve 1/n diversification 
heuristic (or alternatively “randomly” concentrate their contributions in a small group of funds), 
then we would expect to see higher equity allocations when there are more equity funds 
available.    
 
4.  How the Number and Mix of Investment Options Influence Portfolio Decisions 
4.1 Composition of Investment Options and Investment Choices by Number of Funds   
Figure 1 enables us to examine, over the pooled sample 1991-2000, how the share of 
options in a particular asset class changes as the total number of options in the plan increases. 
We find that as firms increase the number of options available to employees, that the increase is 
predominantly concentrated in equity funds.  For example, an increase in total options in the 
401(k) plan from 4 to 12 is associated with an increase in the share of domestic equity funds in 
the plan from just over one quarter of options to almost half of options (at the same time, the 
share of both the bond funds and the company stock fund in the plan fall by roughly 15 
percentage points each).   
  Figure 1 also reports how the share of funds matches up with the share of contributions to 
those funds (numbers are reported in percentage points).  Across all asset types, there is a 
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striking relation between the share of fund options available in each asset class and the share of 
contributions made to funds in that asset class.  Mirroring the pattern with the share of options, 
the share of contributions made to company stock and bond funds fall as the total number of 
options in the 401(k) plan increase, while the share of contributions to domestic equity funds 
rises dramatically as the number of options in the plan increases.  For example, as we move from 
a total of four fund options to a total of twelve, the fraction of contributions made to equity funds 
rises from 30 percent to 56 percent (mirroring the increase in the fraction of equity funds from 28 
to 47 percent).  Though increasing, allocations to international funds seem to be lagging behind 
their increased prominence in 401(k) plans as the number of options expands. 
    Thus, Figure 1 provides initial evidence that employees may be influenced in their overall 
portfolio allocation behavior by the mix of investment choices provided to them.  Specifically, as 
employers provide more options, they appear to be doing so primarily by adding additional 
domestic equity funds (and to a lesser extent international funds).  Correspondingly, participants 
appear to be placing a higher fraction of their portfolio in equities as the fraction of equity 
options rises.  However, clearly other factors, such as asset returns, also affect allocation 
decisions within the plan.  Further, the correlation between the share of options and the share of 
contributions need not be causal, as it could simply reflect firms with risk-averse workers do not 
invest in equities and thus demand fewer equity funds in their 401(k) plans.  To address these 
concerns, we turn to a regression framework. 
4.2 Regression Framework 
We begin by estimating pooled cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent 
variable is the share of contributions allocated to each of our five investment categories.  On the 
right hand side, our primary variable of interest is the fraction of investment options that are in 
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this category.  Thus, when testing for employer stock, we regress the share of contributions to 
company stock against 1/n, which represents the share of total investment options that are 
comprised by the employer stock fund.  For domestic equity funds, we regress the share of 
contributions against e/n, where e is the number of domestic equity funds and n is the total 
number of investment options.  We follow a similar approach for international equity funds, 
bond funds, and balanced funds. 
If the coefficient on the share of fund options is zero, it indicates that individual portfolio 
allocations are not influenced by the mix of investment choices available.  At the other extreme, 
a coefficient of one suggests that individuals, on average, follow a “1/n” strategy, implying that 
the mix of investment options translates nearly one-for-one into changes in portfolio allocations.  
Significant intermediate results would indicate that the mix of investment choice clearly matters, 
though not to the full extent predicted by a strict 1/n hypothesis. 
There are at least two possible explanations that are consistent with there being a positive 
relation between contribution shares and the share of options.  The first possibility is that all 
workers naively diversify across multiple options and thus an increase in the number of options 
would reduce all workers’ allocations to company stock.  A second possibility is that workers 
randomly put their entire 401(k) portfolio in one option, with different workers concentrating 
their purchases in different options, in which case an increase in the number of options would 
reduce the fraction of workers that concentrate all of their holdings in company stock.  Benartzi 
and Thaler (2001) provide evidence of the former and Huberman and Jiang (2006), Agnew 
(2006), and Holden and VanDerhei (2001) provide evidence for the latter, suggesting that both 
types of investors may exist.  With plan-level rather than worker-level data, it is not possible for 
us to distinguish which of these two stories is driving the result. 
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Besides the composition of options in the 401(k) plan, we also control for several other 
firm/plan characteristics as well as year effects in our regressions.  To do this, we merge our 
sample of 11-k filings with Center of Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat data.  
Motivated by Benartzi (2001), we include in our regressions a binary variable for whether the 
firm restricts its employer match to company stock.  We also control for past five-year returns on 
the employer’s stock (taken from CRSP), the company’s stock price volatility (measured as the 
standard deviation of total returns over the past 24 months), market-to-book ratio, log of plan 
assets, whether the firm has a defined benefit plan, whether the firm’s bonds are investment 
grade as a proxy for bankruptcy risk, and year effects.   
Including year effects are important for two reasons.  First, given the unbalanced nature 
of our panel, as discussed in Table 1, it is important to ensure that the “naïve diversification” 
results are not being driven by differences in market returns.  For example, if firms increase the 
number of options over time, in our sample this corresponds with a period of rising equity 
markets.  Thus it is important to ensure that the results are not being driven by individuals 
placing more money into equity funds in response to rising equity markets (this effect will be 
absorbed in the year effects in our regression).  Second, it is likely that the increase in the 
number of investment alternatives over time was due in large part to the proliferation of different 
types of mutual funds offered over the past decade.  For example, the ICI reports that the total 
number of mutual funds rose from 3,403 in 1991 to 8,155 in 2000 (Investment Company 
Institute, 2005), with the vast majority of these funds being equity funds.  Year effects will pick 
up this potential “demand” for equities as manifested by greater fund offerings. 
4.3 Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
Table 4 displays the results of the pooled cross-sectional regressions of the share of 
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employee contributions in a particular asset class against the share of fund options in this same 
class using our sample of 401(k) plans over the period 1991-2000.  Regressions are estimated 
separately for each assert class and are only estimated over firm-year observations that offered at 
least one option of that particular type in their 401(k) plan.  For all five asset classes, we find 
positive and significant relations between the share of contributions and the share of options in 
the plan, confirming that the patterns displayed in Figure 1 also hold in the presence of firm-
specific characteristics and year controls.  For domestic equity funds, the coefficient on the share 
of equity options in the plan is 0.70.  To assist in the literal interpretation of this coefficient, 
imagine a firm has five investment options available, three of which are equity funds and two of 
which are fixed income funds.  If the firm added another equity option, the share of equity 
choices changes from 3/5 to 4/6, or an increase of 6.7 percentage points.  Multiplying by the 0.70 
coefficient implies that participants would be expected, on average, to increase their allocation to 
equities by 4.7 percentage points.  For company stock investments, we cannot reject the “1/n” 
hypothesis (i.e., cannot reject a coefficient of one on the share of options).  This would suggest, 
at first glance, that the trend of adding more options to 401(k) plans has contributed considerably 
to a reduction in contributions to company stock over the past decade.  The coefficient on the 
share of options in the plan is the smallest for bond funds, but still highly significant.  The 
smaller sensitivity for bond funds is not surprising given that fixed income funds are often 
chosen as the “default” investment for participants who do not make an active alternative 
selection. 
   Our results on the other variables are generally consistent with previous findings.  
Consistent with Benartzi (2001) and Brown, Liang, & Weisbenner (2006), we find that 
employees at firms where the employer match is restricted to company stock direct, on average, 
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7.0 percentage points more of their own contributions to company stock.  Only about one-third 
of this 7.0 percentage point increase comes out of allocations to other equity funds, while 44% 
comes out of fixed income investments.  Prior research (e.g., Benartzi 2001, Huberman & 
Sengmueller 2004, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick 2004b, and Agnew 2006) suggests that 
individuals are more likely to invest in their employer’s stock if it has performed well in recent 
years.  We also find that holdings of own employer stock are positively related to past 5 year 
returns on that stock, while the share of contributions directed toward other equity investments is 
significantly negatively related to own company stock performance.  The company stock 
purchase rate is higher at less volatile firms, larger firms, and firms with higher market-to-book 
ratios (a proxy for growth opportunities).  The presence of a defined benefit plan or an 
investment grade bond rating has little effect on participant investment decisions. 
4.4 Panel Regression Results 
  A potential concern with any cross-sectional regression is that there is tremendous 
heterogeneity across firms (and the workers across firms), and thus one might be concerned 
about spurious correlation, such as differences in risk tolerance across workers in different firms.  
To address this, we add firm fixed effects to our regression specification.  The inclusion of these 
891 firm-specific fixed effects absorb all of the variation in the allocation of contributions that 
can be attributed to time-invariant differences in the characteristics of firms and their employees.  
In other words, with firm fixed effects in place, the coefficient on the share of options in an asset 
class is identifying the relationship of interest from within-firm changes over time in the number 
of investment options offered. 
  The results of these fixed effects regressions are displayed in Table 5.  By comparing the 
results with those obtained in the cross-sectional regressions presented in Table 4, two 
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conclusions emerge.  First, in general, pension plan parameters remain important determinants of 
investor behavior after controlling for firm-level fixed effects.  Importantly, the influence of the 
number and mix of investment options on portfolio choice is still quite strong for equity funds.  
For example, controlling for firm-level fixed effects, the coefficient on the share of equity funds 
is a highly significant 0.45 (compared to 0.70 in the cross-sectional regression).  To put this 
coefficient into perspective, imagine a firm that began with three equity funds and two bond 
funds adds a fourth equity fund.  Applying the 0.452 coefficient indicates that this change would 
be expected to increase the allocation of contributions to equity by 3.0 percentage points, which 
represents a nontrivial change in the risk/return profile of participant portfolios.  The coefficients 
on the share of options for international funds, bond funds, and balanced funds are of similar 
magnitude.   
Second, firm-level heterogeneity is also an important determinant of how 401(k) assets 
are allocated, particularly in the context of company stock.  While one cannot reject that there is 
a one-for-one relation between the fraction of contributions allocated to an employer’s company 
stock and the fraction of options in the plan that are company stock (since company stock is one 
option, this fraction is simply 1 / total plan options) in the cross section, the magnitude of this 
relation drops by over two-thirds once firm-specific fixed effects are included in the regression.  
This suggests that while in the cross section, firms with more options in their 401(k) plan 
contributed less to company stock, this in large part likely represents firm-level heterogeneity in 
the desirability of company stock investments (which manifests itself both in employee 
contributions to company stock as well as how many non-company stock options are present in 
the 401(k) plan) as opposed to a “1/n” behavioral response.  This conclusion is supported by 
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Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2006) who find that firms that provide employer-matching 
contributions in company stock tend to offer fewer options in the 401(k) plan as well.   
Benartzi (2001) finds evidence of an “endorsement” effect, that is, workers in firms 
where the employer provides a match in company stock tend to invest substantially more of their 
own contributions in company stock (and attributes this to the workers viewing a firm match in 
company stock as implicit investment advice).  While we also found such a relation in the cross 
section, the relation between match policy and employee contributions disappears once we 
control for firm-level fixed effects (the coefficient falls over 2/3 in magnitude and is no longer 
statistically significant).
8  Thus, investments in company stock in the pension plan appear to be 
driven in no small part by firm or worker-specific characteristics outside of the pension plan. 
These results provide clear evidence that the number and mix of investment options 
matter in determining the equity/bond mix in retirement plans.  An important policy implication 
of this finding is that the choice of investment options to make available in an individual 
accounts program is likely to have a first-order effect on the portfolio allocations that individuals 
make.  This finding is not based on cross-sectional correlations, but rather is obtained from a 
panel data set, enabling us to control for heterogeneity in the investment preferences of workers 
across firms and across time. 
4.5 Robustness Checks of Panel Regression Results 
  The regression results in Table 5 were obtained in a firm-fixed effects framework.  Thus, 
the coefficient on the share of options in an asset class is identifying the relationship of interest 
from within-firm changes over time in the number of investment options offered.  We attribute 
the resulting correlation between the share of contributions and the share of options to a 
                                                 
8 Forty-two firms change match policy over the sample, enabling us to identify the match policy or “endorsement” 
effect in a firm-fixed effects regression. 
  21 
behavioral motivation (i.e., the “1/n” hypothesis or more generally that the mix of options 
“matters”).  However, there are rational, alternative explanations for this result that we address in 
Table 6. 
  First, it may be the case that until the firm offers a broad-based equity index fund, 
additional equity options may actually expand the return-risk frontier for the participants (thus 
leading to greater contributions to equity funds).  Once an index fund is in the plan, though, 
additional equity options should not “matter” for the participant, thus weakening the relation 
between the share of equity contributions and the share of equity options.  Column (2) in Table 6 
demonstrates that this is not the case, having an index option in the plan does not reduce the 
sensitivity of contributions to equity funds to the number of equity options in the plan (the 
interaction term with the share of equity options is insignificant).
9  Similarly, if the firm has only 
one equity option, then adding a second equity option might provide some sort of diversification 
that expands the return-risk frontier for the participants and thus leads to increased equity 
allocations.  However, the addition of a fourth of fifth equity option is likely to provide no 
diversification benefit, and thus the relation between share of contributions and share of options 
should weaken with the number of equity options in the plan.  Again, column (3) demonstrates 
that this is not the case, as the relation between the share of contributions and the share of 
options does not change with the number of equity options in the plan. 
  Another alternative explanation is that a change in equity options within a plan happens 
as a result of increased demand for equity that is just starting to surface in employee 
contributions within the plan.  In other words, as demand for equities in the 401(k) plan grows, 
this leads to increased contributions to equity funds in aggregate, as well as the firm adding some 
                                                 
9 For ease of comparison, the first column of Table 6 replicates the fixed-effect coefficient on the share of equity 
options from Table 5. 
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additional equity funds.  Thus, there is an omitted variable, the change in past equity demand, 
that really drives the (spurious) relation we observe between the share of equity options and the 
share of equity contributions.  To control for this “demand” story, we also include the past 
change in the fraction of contributions to equity funds in the regression.  Its inclusion has no 
effect on the coefficient of interest, that on the share of equity options, while the coefficient on 
the change in past contributions to equity funds is itself small in magnitude and insignificant (see 
column (4)). 
Finally, up to this point, we have lumped both actively-managed funds and index funds 
together.  Columns (5) and (6) present regression results examining these types of equity funds 
separately.  We find that for both types of equity funds, the share of funds of their type in the 
plan affects investment decisions.  For example, suppose a firm has one equity index fund, one 
bond fund, and company stock as investment options.  If that firm adds four actively-managed 
equity funds to the mix, allocations to the index fund will be predicted to fall by 7.9 percentage 
points (coefficient of 0.416 multiplied by (0.33 – 0.14)). 
After having established a robust relation between the mix of options in 401(k) plans and 
investment decisions we next consider how trends in the mutual fund industry have affected 
pension plans.  In particular, we consider whether the increased number of actively-managed 
equity funds over the past 10 years has trickled down to 401(k) plans, and how it has affected the 
expenses and performance of participants in their retirement plans. 
 
5.  Index versus Actively Managed Funds 
As referenced earlier, the number of mutual funds available to investors in the U.S. has 
growth dramatically, driven by the surge in equity funds (particularly actively-managed) over the 
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past decade.  The mutual fund literature (e.g., Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996), 
Carhart (1997), and Daniel, et al (1997)) finds that actively managed funds charge substantially 
higher annual fees than do index funds (such as S&P 500 funds), without earning higher after-
expense returns on average (and perhaps perform no better before expenses).  Do trends in 
401(k) plan fund offerings mirror the aggregate trends in the mutual fund industry?  If so, this 
raises the concern that change in the composition of investment options offered in 401(k) plans 
could result in more money being allocated to high-cost funds that will on average result in lower 
net returns. 
To address these questions, we augment our 11-k data set described in Section 3.  In 
particular, we follow the firms that had 11-k data during 1998 in the original sample over the 
next four years (1999-2002).  This enables us to better assess trends in 401(k) plans over a longer 
time series.  One disadvantage of the later data is that we are restricted to looking at the 
allocation of asset balances rather than the flow of contributions, but this will not be an issue for 
the analyses we conduct below.
10
In Figure 2, we see that the average number of options in 401(k) plans has increased from 
just below 6 options in 1993 to 14 options in 2002.  Over that period, the average number of 
actively-managed equity funds in the plan has dramatically increased from 1.6 in 1993 to 6.4 in 
2002, while the number of index funds offered in 401(k) plans only increased slightly over the 
period and still remains very small (averaging no more than one option in the plan over every 
year in the sample). 
Figure 3 confirms that the vast majority of new funds (two-thirds) added to 401(k) plans 
over 1998-2002 are actively-managed equity funds (mirroring the broader trends in the mutual 
                                                 
10 The reason for the difference between the pre-1999 and the 1999 – 2002 data is that the SEC changes the 
reporting requirements on the 11-k. 
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fund industry), while a mere 8% of the new options represent an index fund (typically 
introducing an S&P fund for the first time or adding a small-cap index fund to a S&P 500 fund 
already in place).  Coupled with our earlier findings in Section 4, this trend in new fund offerings 
has strong implications for the relation between the investment performance of these retirement 
plans and the number of fund options provided. 
Of course, investors interested in low cost index funds really only need one broad market 
index, and thus it is possible that the majority of allocations flow to this low-cost option (as 
opposed to the higher-cost actively managed alternatives).  Our previous regression results in 
Tables 4, 5, and 6 suggest this is unlikely to be the case, and Table 7 confirms this.  In Table 7, 
we demonstrate that the share of equity options in the plan comprised of actively-managed funds 
increases with an increase in the total number of equity funds in the plan, as does the fraction of 
equity assets held in actively-managed funds.  Regression analysis (not reported) confirms that 
the share of assets in actively-managed funds (index funds) increases (decreases) substantially 
with the number of total equity funds in the plan.  This result is consistent with the notion that 
the burgeoning number of actively-managed funds makes it harder for investors to find the 
lower-cost index fund in the plan (with less money flowing to this option as a result). 
Of interest is the “quality” of the actively-managed equity funds offered in the 401(k) 
plans relative to the index funds offered.  To provide an initial sense of the “quality” of the 
actively-managed relative to the index funds (at least as measured by their past long-term 
performance and annual costs) we present in Table 8 differences in the following variables:  past 
five-year returns before expenses, expenses, past five-year returns after expenses, and percentile 
ranking of the fund based on its past five-year returns (after expenses) within its investment 
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objective (such as small-cap growth) as determined by Morningstar.
11  Table 8 demonstrates that 
while the actively managed and index equity funds offered in our sample of 401(k) plans have 
similar performance before accounting for expenses (index funds actually slightly outperformed, 
but the difference is not significant), they differ significantly in their reported annual expenses 
(on the order of 50 basis points per year), which leads to worse performance after accounting for 
expenses (both in terms of returns and percentile rankings within its investment objective). 
Table 9 conducts a similar analysis at the firm level.  For each firm-year observation, we 
calculate the average expenses across all the domestic equity options in the plan as well as the 
average Morningstar percentile rankings for performance over the next year.  We relate these 
variables to the fraction of domestic equity funds in the 401(k) plan that is actively managed, 
controlling for both firm-specific and year fixed effects.  The results suggest that switching from 
all index equity funds to all actively-managed equity funds increases the firm-level average 
expenses for equity funds by 36 to 47 basis points per year, and thus reduces the firm-level 
average performance ranking of its equity funds over the next year by 15 percentage points in the 
Morningstar Percentile Rankings. 
Given historically that actively-managed funds do not outperform index funds (perhaps 
even before expenses), these investment patterns (coupled with the composition of the new funds 
offered) could result in a nontrivial reduction in resources available for retirement.  For 
example, consider a worker who starts at age 22 earning $30,000 per year and experiences 4% 
nominal annual earnings growth until they retire at age 62.  Suppose this worker saves 6% of 
salary per year in a 401(k) and receives a matching contribution equal to 3% of salary.  If this 
individual earns an 8% nominal net return on their investments, she would have $1.142 million 
                                                 
11 These variables are provided by merging our sample of 401(k) fund offerings with the CRSP and Morningstar 
mutual fund databases.  Morningstar percentile rankings are scaled from 0 to 100 where 0 is the worst performer and 
100 is the best performer. 
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at retirement.  If, instead, this individual received nominal annual net returns that were 35 basis 
points lower than this, or 7.65%, she would have only $1.065 million at retirement.  In short, due 
to the power of compounding, a 0.35% per year difference in annual returns accumulates to a 
nontrivial 7.5% difference in terminal wealth at retirement.  The fact that individual investors 
may not be fully considering the important role that expenses play in reducing their retirement 
wealth is consistent with the findings of Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2006) who show that 
highly educated subjects (Harvard undergrads and Wharton MBAs) are surprisingly 
unresponsive to differences in expense ratios when selecting a mutual fund, even when the 
underlying investment is otherwise nearly identical.   
 
6.  Conclusions 
  A key policy issue in the design and implementation of any defined contribution pension 
system, whether publicly or privately provided, is how to structure the investment options that 
will be made available to participants.  While it is well understood that the structure of 
investment options can have an important effect on the level of administrative expenses of an 
individual accounts program, we show that the number and mix of investment options can also 
have a first order effect on the risk and return profile of average portfolios.  Even after 
controlling for individual firm and year fixed effects, we find a strong positive relationship 
between the share of investment options provided to employees in a particular asset class and the 
share of their portfolios invested in that asset class.  This strongly suggests that average 
participants are not optimally allocating their portfolios according to standard finance theory 
predictions, but instead are following naïve strategies that subject them to “manipulation” by 
non-binding changes in the number and mix of investment options.  A key policy implication is 
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that the number and mix of investment options will have an important effect on overall asset 
allocation in the individual accounts.  In short, it appears to be possible to influence the portfolio 
allocation of individual participants by altering the mix of equity and bond funds, even if the 
overall investment opportunity set remains unchanged.   
  By exploiting panel data on 401(k) plans, we find that both plan parameters and firm-
level heterogeneity are important in explaining investment decisions.  Investments in company 
stock, in particular, seem to be driven more by differences in workers across firms (or 
unobserved differences in the firms themselves) than by cross-sectional differences in pension 
plan characteristics (such as whether the match is in company stock or the number of non-
company stock options in the retirement plan).  This highlights the importance of exploiting 
panel data in identifying behavioral responses to pension plan characteristics. 
  Finally, the proliferation of actively-managed equity funds in general (which has trickled 
down to offerings in 401(k) plans as well), has resulted in the vast majority of money in 
retirement plans flowing into higher-cost actively managed equity funds as opposed to lower-
cost equity index funds (such as S&P 500 funds).  This results in plan participants paying higher 
fees, which will depress overall portfolio performance, and thus, in the long-term, depress 
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Table 1:  Sample Composition 
 
Data collected for all U.S. companies listed in Compustat any year from 1993 to 1999 that filed an 11-k at least once during 1994-2001, and for 
which complete fund classification was possible.  See text for further details. 
 
Year  Number of 
observations 






1991 29  1  211 211 
1992 128  2  194  388 
1993 240  3  166  498 
1994 314  4  107  428 
1995 398  5  86  430 
1996 487  6  72  432 
1997 537  7  40  280 
1998 566  8  13  104 
1999 65  9  1  9 
2000 26  10  1  10 
TOTAL 2,790 TOTAL  891  2,790 
 
  
Table 2a:  Characteristics of 1998 Sample, S&P 1500, and Public Firms 
 
Data for S&P 1500 and public firms are from Compustat.  Public firms include 7,501 U.S. firms. 
 
  1998 Sample  S&P 1500  Public Firms 
Market Value ($ millions) 
        Mean 
        Median 
        [ 10
th % – 90













[ 26 – 3,260 ] 
Employees (000s) 
        Mean 
        Median 
        [ 10
th % – 90













[ 0.02 – 10.2 ] 
Member of S&P 1500 (%) 
 
52 100 20 
Technology Sector (%) 
 




Table 2b:  Aggregate 401-k Plan Assets and Contributions for 1998 Sample, Public Firms, and All Firms 
 
Data on 401-k assets for public firms are from 1998 5500 filings with the Department of Labor.  Data for all firms (public and private) are estimated by the Department of Labor.  Company stock for 
public firms and all firms excludes stock indirectly held in trusts and pooled accounts. Employer contributions constitute 29 percent of total contributions for the 1998 sample and 31percent for all public 
firms. 
 
  1998 Sample  Public Firms  All Firms 
Total 401-k Assets ($ billions) 
 
249 698  1,541 
Employee and Employer Contributions ($ billions)  
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Table 3.  Composition of Plan Options and Employee Contributions in 401(k) Plans by Fund Type, Pooled Sample 1991-2000 
 
Data from 11-k forms.  See text for further information. 
 
 Mean  10
th Percentile  25
th Percentile  Median  75
th Percentile  90
th Percentile 
Total Number of Options in Plan  7.8 4.0 5.0 7.0 9.0  12.0 
        Company Stock Fund  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
        Domestic Equity Funds  3.1  1.0  2.0  3.0  4.0  6.0 
        International Equity Funds  0.7  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
        Bond Funds  2.3  1.0  2.0  2.0  3.0  4.0 
        Balanced / Life Cycle Funds  0.7  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Share of Options in Plan (in percent)        
        Company Stock Fund  15  8  11  14  20  25 
        Domestic Equity Funds  38  20  29  38  50  56 
        International Equity Funds  8  0  0  8  14  17 
        Bond Funds  31  17  20  29  40  50 
        Balanced / Life Cycle Funds  9  0  0  8  15  20 
Share of Employee Contributions 
Allocated to Fund Type (in percent)        
        Company Stock Fund  19  3  7  14  26  43 
        Domestic Equity Funds  44  20  31  45  58  68 
        International Equity Funds  4  0  0  1  7  13 
        Bond Funds  26  8  14  22  35  48 
        Balanced / Life Cycle Funds  7  0  0  2  12  21  
 
Table 4.  Regression of Share of Contributions Against Share of Fund Options,  
Pooled Cross-Sections 1991-2000 
 
Each column of this table represents a separate regression.  The dependent variable is the share of contributions allocated to a particular 
asset class, and the regression is estimated for the sample of firms that offer at least one option in that asset class.  The robust standard 
errors, which are reported in parentheses, are clustered on each firm in order to account for correlation across time for a given firm.  See 
text for further information. 
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Year  Fixed  Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm  Fixed  Effects? No No No No No 
Adjusted R
2 0.272 0.477 0.271 0.321 0.244 
#  of  Observations  1,935 1,900 1,045 1,911 1,065 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
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Table 5.  Regression of Share of Contributions Against Share of Fund Options,  
Firm Fixed Effects 1991-2000 
 
Each column of this table represents a separate regression.  The dependent variable is the share of contributions allocated to a particular 
asset class, and the regression is estimated for the sample of firms that offer at least one option in that asset class.  The robust standard 
errors, which are reported in parentheses, are clustered on each firm in order to account for correlation across time for a given firm.  See 
text for further information. 
 
  Share of Contributions in: 
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Year  Fixed  Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm  Fixed  Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2 0.875 0.868 0.808 0.828 0.797 
#  of  Observations  1,935 1,900 1,045 1,911 1,065 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
  
Table 6.  Robustness of Relation Between Contributions to Equity Funds and Number of Equity Options 
 
Each column of this table represents a separate regression.  The dependent variable is the share of contributions allocated to a particular asset class, and the regression is estimated for the sample of firms 
that offer at least one option in that asset class.  All regressions also include all the other variables listed in Tables 4 and 5.  The robust standard errors, which are reported in parentheses, are clustered on 
each firm in order to account for correlation across time for a given firm.  See text for further information. 
 
  Share of Contributions in: 




Equity Index  
Funds 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 




















Share of Options that are Equity 
Funds * (Have equity index fund)    -0.041 
(0.030)        
Share of Options that are Equity 
Funds * (Have 3-4 equity options)     0.041 
(0.029)      
Share of Options that are Equity 
Funds * (Have 5+ equity options)     -0.013 
(0.036)      
Change in Share of Contributions to 
Equity Funds During Prior Year 
(share in year t-1 less share in year t-2) 
    0.006 
(0.114)    
Year Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2 0.868 0.869 0.870  0.892  0.863  0.875 
# of Observations  1,900  1,900  1,900  879  1,797  898 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
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Table 7.  Composition of Domestic Equity Options and Contributions to Equity Funds in 401(k) Plans, 1991-2002  
 
Data from 11-k forms.  The number of domestic equity options in, share of domestic equity options in, and share of domestic equity assets in actively-managed funds and index funds represents the 
average across firm-year observations.  See text for further information. 
 
Share of Domestic Equity Options in:  Share of Domestic Equity Assets in:  Total # of Domestic Equity Fund 








1  0.77 0.23 0.77 0.23 
2  0.80 0.20 0.79 0.21 
3  0.81 0.19 0.80 0.20 
4  0.83 0.17 0.80 0.20 
5  0.84 0.16 0.80 0.20 
6  0.85 0.15 0.81 0.19 
7  0.86 0.14 0.81 0.19 
8  0.88 0.12 0.83 0.17 
9  0.89 0.11 0.85 0.15 
10  0.88 0.12 0.82 0.18 
11+  0.90 0.10 0.84 0.16 
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Table 8.  Difference in Performance and Costs of Actively-Managed Funds Relative to Index Funds in 401(k) Plans, 1991-2002 
 
Regressions of performance and cost differences across domestic actively-managed and domestic index equity funds are estimated at the fund-year level (i.e., the unit of observation is a fund offering in 
a given firm plan in a given year) for a sample of 401(k) plans from 1991-2002.  The past five-year gross return regression is based on 15,067 fund-year observations, the expense regression is based on 
17,599 fund-year observations, the past five-year net return regression is based on 15,161 fund-year observations, and the Morningstar percentile ranking regression is based on 15,153 fund-year 
observations.  Because of the difference in sample sizes, the difference in gross return minus the difference in expenses, need not equal the difference in net returns.  The robust standard errors, which 
are reported in parentheses, are clustered at the fund level.  See text for further information. 
 
  Difference in Performance and Costs of Actively-Managed Funds Relative to Index Funds 
 
(returns and expenses are reported in percent on an annualized basis,  






Past Five-Year Gross 
Return (before 
expenses) 




Objective (based on 
past 5-year net returns) 






















*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
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Table 9.  Regression of Expenses and Performance of Domestic Equity Allocations within 401(k) Plans  
by Fraction of Domestic Equity Funds that are Actively-Managed, 1991-2002  
 
Regressions of average expenses of domestic equity funds within a 401(k) plan and the average Morningstar percentile ranking of domestic equity funds within a 401(k) plan are presented.  Morningstar 
percentile rankings are scaled from 0 to 100 where 0 is the worst performer and 100 is the best performer and are based upon performance of the fund over the next year within its objective.  The robust 






Firm-level average expenses  
for equity funds in plan 
(in percent) 
Firm-level average Morningstar Percentile 
Rankings for performance over the next year  
for equity funds in plan 
(in percentage points) 
  Unweighted  Weighted by  
Fund Assets  Unweighted  Weighted by  
Fund Assets 
Fraction of Equity Funds that 













Year and Firm Fixed Effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2 0.753 0.757 0.254 0.254 
# of Observations  3,842 3,842 3,824 3,824 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
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Share of Fund Options Share of Contributions
 
Data from 11-k forms.  See text for further information.
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Number of Domestic Equity Index Funds Number of Domestic Actively-Managed Equity Funds Number of Other Funds
 
Data from 11-k forms.  See text for further information.
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Data from 11-k forms.  See text for further information. 
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